

REMARKS

Claims 1-17 are pending. Claims 1, 9 and 17 are independent. Claims 1-4, 6, 9-11, 14 and 17 have been amended as to matters of form without narrowing their scope.

Claims 1-17 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over U.S. Patent No. 6,754,662 (Li) in view of U.S. Patent Publication No. 2004/49494 (Kottisa). Applicant traverses.

Independent claim 1 is directed to a packet search device that includes, *inter alia*, a first search processor that searches predetermined conditional statements corresponding to a plurality of information areas included in header information of an inputted packet, to generate first search results using a first search method. The packet search device also includes a second search processor that searches the first search results of the first search processor using a second search method that is different from the first search method.

Li is directed to a packet classification system that endeavors to perform high speed classification of input packets by using efficient hash-caching. As was recognized in previous Office Actions, Li does not teach the limitations discussed above. The position was taken in the Office Action that Kottisa remedies this deficiency of Li as a reference. Applicant disagrees.

Also, the Office Action improperly dissects limitations and then applies prior art to the dissected limitation. For example, the position was taken that Li shows “a second search processing means.” However, claim 1, did not simply recite “second search processing means.” Claim 1 recited specific functionality for the recited second search processing means, that is not found anywhere in Li. It is quite misleading to intimate that Li in any way teaches the recited second search processing means, now “second search processor,” since the element in Li alleged to correspond did not actually perform the recited function.

Claim 1, as amended, includes a second search processor that searches the first search results of the first search processor using a second search method that is different from the first search method. Li is completely devoid of any teaching or remote suggestion of such a processor

with such a functionality. For Kottisa to remedy this deficiency in Li would require that Kottisa show a second search processor that searches the first search results of a first search processor using a second search method that is different from the first search method. Kottisa contains no such teaching and thus fails to remedy this deficiency.

Kottisa relates to a system that allows a user that has performed an Internet search to more easily look through, i.e., "traverse" the search results. According to Kottisa, typical search results may include thousands of results that are not of any interest to the user. Kottisa's system arranges the search results of the search engine, originally presented in a first order, into a second order, with the hope that the new order will make it more likely that relevant search results will be seen by the user as he looks through the results.

In Kottisa, the *only* search processor identified is the search engine 2. No second search processor is disclosed Kottisa that performs a search of the first search results of search engine 2 using a second search method that is different from the search method used in search engine 2. Thus, Kottisa completely fails to remedy the above-identified deficiency of Kottisa.

It is also noted that Kottisa's scrambling of the search results, in the hope that a user will spot more relevant results, does not amount to performing a new search on the results of the search engine. It simply *rearranges* the same search results. Moreover, with regard to the "traversing" by the user, the user cannot be said to be a second search processor, and there is no teaching, in any event, as to any method the user might be using to traverse the search results.

Thus, even if Li and Kottisa are combined, they do not teach or suggest all of the elements recited in claim 1. The other independent claims recite a substantially similar limitation and are believed patentable for the same reasons. The dependent claims are believed patentable for at least the same reasons as their respective base claims.

In view of the foregoing, applicant believes the pending application is in condition for allowance.

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Respectfully submitted,

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